Monday, January 31, 2011

Other way round, I think

Cosma writes:

1. Obviously, macroeconomic phenomena are the aggregated (or, if you like, the emergent) consequences of microeconomic interactions. What else could they be? Analogously, the macroscopic physical properties of condensed matter all ultimately emerge from molecular interactions.

2. Macroeconomic theories which do not derive such phenomena from microscopic interactions are thus incomplete, and intellectually unsatisfying. Analogously, theories of condensed matter which do not derive the phenomena from molecular interactions are incomplete.

So: the true and complete theory of macroeconomics must emerge from the true and complete theory of microeconomics.


to which I don't wholly object ... or maybe I do. I agree with 1. And I agree with the lemma after "So:". But I don't really agree with 2. Not so much in what it says, as the way it says it.

My argument would be that what is it that we really care about when we do economics? The big questions, the ones of price, production, employment and trade. The stuff about individual transactions and agents can be ferociously interesting, and even sometimes useful, once in a blue moon (if you want to buy a second hand car for example), but the point of studying economics is to get answers that are useful at the aggregate, policy level.

So I'd turn this on its head. It isn't about "Does macroeconomics need microfoundations?". It's about "Does microeconomics need macroconsequences?". Leaving the stuff about condensed matter out, I'd rewrite 2 as:

2: Theories of microscopic interactions which do not imply accurate predictions about macroeconomic phenomena are thus incomplete, and intellectually unsatisfying.

And then the rest of the argument goes through mutatis mutandis, right through to the analogies with particle physics. Price theory, the expected utility model of choice theory and Nash/von Neumann/Morgenstern game theory have done very well in their fields - they even quite clearly describe certain aspects of the underlying truth about how economic actors behave. But they've failed the most crucial test - they don't help us generalise out to a theory of the behaviour of the whole economy, taken as a whole. They don't even (as the statements made by half the Chicago faculty over the last three years demonstrate more than adequately) help us to avoid saying things about the macroeconomy which fail to respect adding-up and stock/flow-consistency constraints, or well-established empirical relationships.

The New Keynesian project worked in this sort of spirit - recognising that we basically only had one family of macroeconomic models which even slightly worked, and attempting to work back into microeconomics to justify it. This approach, unfortunately, led us to DGSE and all that; it didn't work. I think that the conclusion from that ought to be that you can't get the Keynesian (or rather, the correct - the eventual macro model might not be Keynesian I suppose) conclusions simply from price theory and game theory[1], and so microeconomics needs to be re-established on some other basis that preserves the insights of what Phil Mirowski called the "cyborg science" era but moves on. In some unspecified way that I don't care about because I don't really agree with Cosma that there's anything particularly unsatisfying about macroeconomics without microfoundations[2].

[1] Or at least without explicitly modelling such a complicated and combinatorially huge nexus of principal/agent interactions at every management level of every firm, giving you a map potentially several times larger than the territory.

[2] This might be because my brain is smaller than his and thus more easily repleted.

Edit: reading back, I don't think I've emphasised enough how much I agree with Cosma's actual argument - I just think it's a damnable impudence on the part of microeconomists to have ever claimed otherwise! I also tend toward the view (also, I think, held by JW Mason) that any "correct theory of microeconomics" which has enough relevant and accurate macroimplication, is going to have imported a hell of a lot of specific and contingent institutional detail, rather than looking anything like a general theory of decision-making (there's another subject where all that stuff belongs, and it's called "decision theory", not "economics", but I think that demarcation dispute is for another time).

12 comments:

  1. If I understand correctly, then I am happy to agree with this. Indeed, it's what I was trying to get at in my point (5), though I didn't have the wit to put it quite so plainly.

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  2. Arguably the analogy to physics is even better than that - one of the main reasons to need a better understanding of quantum mechanics was to build a nuclear bomb. Similarly, micro is really helpful if you're working on a financial WMD.

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  3. What's needed, I reckon, is some sort of supervenience notion.

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  4. "Some adjustment of our various theories, models and techniques is required, but it seems mere prejudice that it should always be macro which adjusts."

    This can be (quite rightly) pushed a long way. Almost no academic discipline is free of writings and theories which work in two different related fields, but which are ridiculous in one of them while being brilliant in the other. This is sometimes justified by mere professional specialization but more often also by the establishment of a hierarchy between the fields, with the better-formalized and more "fundamental" field entirely dominant.

    More generally, malignant slippery-slope arguments can easily produced by working on only one end of a two-level question.

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  5. "the expected utility model of choice theory and Nash/von Neumann/Morgenstern game theory have done very well in their fields - they even quite clearly describe certain aspects of the underlying truth about how economic actors behave." Huh ?

    What sort of evidence would convince you they had done quite poorly in their fields ? Von Neumann/Morgenstern expected utility theory starts with a few assertions. They are false.

    Experiments have been used to test their game theory too. They almost always reject.

    Von Nueman's contributions to the human sciences contain no testable predictions which have not been rejected by the data.

    The only argument that they describe aspects of "the underlying truth" is that they definitely don't describe vulgar truths which can be detected by observation so they must describe some higher essential truth.

    If there record is one of success, then what is failure.

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  6. What sort of evidence would convince you they had done quite poorly in their fields ?

    Well, if the UK government had ended up auctioning off mobile phone spectrum for lots less than it was worth. If that Irish journalist had to pay close to list price for his car. Most importantly, of course, if strategic deterrence hadn't worked and we were all dead.

    In general I'm about as sceptical as you are about game theory (and I can see how one might argue that all three of my examples are unusual cases where you can be reasonably sure that the other guy's playing game theory), but there is something to it. Even if all it gives us is a theory of the behaviour of paranoid schizophrenics and cyborgs, that's not nothing.

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  7. Well yeah, if you train people as economists then they will follow the tenets of game theory. Its an approach to theoretical failures I guess. Kind of like the neoliberal experiment. Faced with evidence that people don't behave like rational economic actors, economists proposed to change the system so as to force them to do so.

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  8. I am glad to find this blog and I agree with the post.

    I wonder how much of the impetus to build microfoundations came from those who hated the conclusions of Keynesian macroeconomics at least as much as its straightforward top-down reasoning (as contrasted with the patently absurd but powerfully pandering assumptions of classical and neoclassical economics).

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  9. "Analogously, the macroscopic physical properties of condensed matter all ultimately emerge from molecular interactions." [Emphasis added]

    That first word would seem to me to be doing an awful lot of heavy lifting. Just how trivial is the analogy, anyway?

    (As I understand it, this is similar to J.W. Mason's point, which is one of the problems with attempting to read from too many browser windows in parallel.)

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  10. "the point of studying economics is to get answers that are useful at the aggregate, policy level"

    Must disagree. As a management consultant, I find that strategy consulting is largely applied micro-economics (mainly industrial organization).

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  11. I think the analogy with fluid mechanics is flawed. Economic actors have widely varying scales. To make the analogy accurate, you would have to include in the model:

    -Middle class people (water molecules)

    -Poor people (hydrogen molecules? Neutrinos?)

    - Rich people (Oil molecules?)

    -Corporations (tadpoles, frogs, fish, barracudas?)

    -Churches, charities, and other nonprofits (jellyfish & octopi?)

    -Governments federal, state, county, and local (Marine mammals? The analogy is getting strained).

    The answer would probably look much more like ecology than like fluid mechanics.

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