... is the throat-clearing equivalent of "you couldn't make it up!" from this prize piece of woo-bashing in the Guardian, via Henry. I don't think it's particularly bacai (although I suspect that I might think otherwise if I had been the civil servant who wrote the rather clever and well-thought-out response it's having a go at), but it's pretty typical of what I consider to be the wrong approach to dealing with homeopathy.
That approach being, of course, roughly that of Monty Python's Bruces sketch - "you're allowed to teach Marx, as long as you make it clear that he was wrong". Actually the select committee report was a bit more aggressive than that - they appear at several points to be saying that it is unethical to prescribe placebos for patients per se, and the practice should possibly be banned and certainly not allowed under the NHS[1].
The phrase I've excerpted for my title is the one that set my bells off - it exactly summarises what I don't like about this approach, in dismissing the fundamental right of a patient to decide on his treatment as being some weirdo hippy shit that should be ignored by Real Men Of Science (he has a few paragraphs ridiculing the idea, which are roughly as hilarious as every other stand up comedy act on the theme of "I don't want all this choice ...").
Brass tacks. People want woo[2]. Actually, they want thoughtful, respectful and sympathetic treatment from general practitioners, but that's a) expensive and b) difficult to achieve given the social realities of the medical profession[4]. So woo is where we are now. It would be difficult and expensive to persuade the population of the UK to not believe in homeopathy, and the main consequence would be an additional burden on GPs. Since there is no special off-budget source of funds for skepticism and its consequences, this would also take money away from our household god, which we don't want to do. So we're left with:
1) on the one hand, some people who want thing X, which doesn't do them much harm compared to the comfort and enjoyment they get out of it,
2) and on the other hand, some other people who don't indulge in X themselves and are not affected materially by it, but who have a belief system and world view which makes them think that nobody should consume thing X.
We've pretty much decided on a schema for this sort of problem as a society, and the Enlightenment Values crowd can hardly object to the solution we decided on as it pretty much kept them from being burned at the stake[6] for two hundred years. That's what the government response is doing; threading the needle between endorsing woo and banning it (or putting unreasonable restrictions on people's realistic ability to get placebo treatments they want[7]), and as far as I can see the DoH response is doing so pretty sensibly.
Tidying up with some answers to questions in the Guardian piece:
You get a sense of this confusion very early on, with lines like: "given the geographical, socioeconomic and cultural diversity in England, [policy on homeopathy] involves a whole range of considerations including, but not limited to, efficacy." I actually have no idea what this means – do medicines work differently in Norfolk from the way they work in Hampshire? The report doesn't elaborate
Well, as discussed in a few comments threads here, the demand for homeopathy, and the kind of cases in which it is a good idea to practice placebo medicine, is built up in a particular set of common conditions (canonically, back pain and allergy medicine). And I would very much imagine that these conditions had geographical, socioeconomic and cultural variance.
One of the phrases Orwell that stuck with me from The Road to Wigan Pier, seems apropos here:
"The underlying motive of many Socialists, I believe, is simply a hypertrophied sense of order. The present state of affairs offends them not because it causes misery, still less because it makes freedom impossible, but because it is untidy; what they desire, basically, is to reduce the world to something resembling a chess-board"
There is certainly an equivalent motivation for people entering the medical profession and its adjuncts.
[1] This would be such a crazy thing to do, and so far out of line with normal medical practice that I suspect that either the government response has taken the select committee out of context, or that I've just got the wrong end of the stick.
[2] A fact! Of actual science! Provable by sociological and economic[3] research!
[3] Sociology and economics! Both actual sciences! In which it is often possible to support hypotheses with evidence to a much greater degree than many areas of medicine!
[4] Also a fact![5]
[5] Actually an unsupported hypothesis, but the sort of statement that could certainly be supported by evidence and achieve the same degree of certainty as the fact referenced above in footnote 2.
[6] Historians who are aware of the very limited extent to which atheists were ever persecuted (heretics, not unbelievers, were largely the ones getting burned), please forgive me for that one.
[7] I could even say "need" here, because plenty consumers of placebo remedies do need them in any sense similar to which most people you'll meet in a GP waiting room[8] need whatever medicine they get prescribed. But actually "want" is all that's necessary for my argument. Giving the people what they want isn't a 'weird fetish' - it's the whole point of the exercise.
[8] Or at least, a GP waiting room in my neck of the woods; see point about social variation above.
Q: Is it ethical for doctors to prescribe, or for pharmacists to supply, patients with medicines which they know to be ineffective but whose manufacturers claim them to be effective? Even if the manufacturers' (false) claims have convinced the patient?
ReplyDeletePut another way: if your patient insists that antibiotics won't do anything for his chest infection, and he knows that what he really needs is a packet of Capstan Full Strength, would you, as a doctor, give him one?
would you, as a doctor, give him one?
ReplyDeletemissus.
There's actually a quite interesting discussion in the select committee report and response about the difference between "efficacious" and "effective". here.
I'm not sure I'm answering the right case here or how realistic this is, but in principle, if you had a slightly bizarre patient for whom you thought a placebo was appropriate but for some contorted reason the only possible placebo was Capstan cigarettes, it might be the right thing to do. Like maybe if he had started taking heroin as a means of giving up smoking. But I can't think of a case in which there would convincingly not be other better possibilities.
The Edzard Ernst view is that prescribing placebo is always unethical, but I'm not sure I agree.
(I do know someone who was advised to start smoking again by his doctor, albeit not on NHS prescription and possibly not as official medical advice, because trying to give up was doing bad things for his schizophrenia).
At the risk of thread-hijacking (worse, with a tedious question that's probably been asked before), DD, do you have any idea why the comment links for your articles are only visible from the main blogspot page, and not from the article permalinks? For those of us wankers who follow via (e.g.) Google Reader, it makes getting to the comment threads an annoyingly convoluted process. (Perhaps this is locally considered a feature?)
ReplyDeleteAs it goes, there is a massive correlation between heavy and persistent tobacco use and psychological problems, and it's almost certainly mostly self-medication. Shame about the poor buggers' lungs, mind you.
ReplyDeleteTo begin with I couldn't see what the problem was with this report, as I'd skim-read it and concentrated on the bits in bold type, on the basis that they were a kind of executive summary. Having read it properly I think there's at least as good a case for reading it as a vigorous push-back (as does the guy in the Graun) as there is for treating it as a series of constructive qualifications and demurrals. And I do agree with him that the assertion that removing homeopathic medicines from the 'medicine' counter would "constrain consumer choice" is feeble at best.
On the other hand, that faux-naif "factors other than efficacy, whatever might those be?" line is silly. Not that this helps the homeopaths - the real point is surely that patient satisfaction could also be measured by a properly designed RCT.
To me the worst part of the response (which Robbins oddly doesn't comment on) is the dip into "teach the controversy" territory, where they say "OK, almost everyone says it doesn't work, but some people say it does... a bit, sometimes... so what are we laymen supposed to conclude? And besides everyone's all worked up about it now, so you lot are obviously never going to agree." Score one to the squid-ink manoeuvre.
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeletePhil - I think the distinction between effectiveness and efficacy is important here, because it's basically the distinction between "doesn't work" and "doesn't work better than placebo". And that matters a lot because what we're talking about here is placebo medicine. So it's not "teach the controversy" in the pejorative sense - if anything, the response understates the extent to which Edzard Ernst (who it should be noted, has forgotten more than I'll ever know about the research on placebo) has a very extreme view which (as his testimony makes clear) is based on the ethics of lying as much as it is on evidence.
ReplyDeleteBACAI, dd does not think that those who prefer a sugar pill prescription to the truth are dunces, though I'm guessing that you do or you wouldn't have equivocated his assertion that these people exist with an announcement of the "regrettable stupidity of the general populace".
ReplyDelete"BACAI", your comment's been deleted. It was quite a long one, and I expect it took a bit of time and trouble, which is why I deleted it; I'm establishing the principle that you can't just randomly insult the management consequence-free.
ReplyDeleteOthers: It really was just argumentum ad hominem. Perhaps it's true that I'm a boastful contrarian who only wants to show off. But a) this is clearly a separate question from the STSC report on homepathy, b) I think my regular readers only need to be reminded of this occasionally if true, and c) I'm 37, it's too late for major personality changes, so we might as well all try to live in the world as we find it.
Furthermore, being a cunt about it is not a basic principle of science.
The irony is (and this is something Ben Goldacre in particular does get) that placebo medicine could have a big & woo-less future. Ben G. talked a while ago about a study in which doctors prescribed placebos openly - "Research suggests that patients with your condition are sometimes helped by something called a 'placebo'. This is a pill containing no active ingredients.", and so on. I would really like to see an RCT of that approach vs homeopathy prescribed by believers. (Difficult to set up, admittedly.)
ReplyDeletefurther to Phil:
ReplyDeleteI think that the stuff about leaving the homeopathic medicines where they are seems to be basically based on European law; there was apparently a directive on how the labelling regime should distinguish between homeopathy and proper medicince - although I am not a big fan of where the line ended up being drawn and distinctly queasy about the phrase "homeopathic medicine" being legal, I'm a supporter of the general principle of a single European market and I guess you take the rough with the smooth.
On "the real point is surely that patient satisfaction could also be measured by a properly designed RCT" though, I think you're overestimating what's deliverable. It's not just a matter of having a randomised controlled trial of how GPs ought to behave (which itself would be no trivial task) - you've then got the task of making them actually do it. Given the very small budgetary cost of the homeopaths, I think that "let's not do that" is going to win any cost/benefit calculation.
ahh, we crossed in the mails. I don't think Edzard Ernst would be all that happy with that approach - it seems to me to be just basically deceiving-without-lying. In which case, why not just give them the woo already if that's what they want?
ReplyDeleteBut where's the deceit? The placebo effect is real, and there is evidence that sufferers from some conditions, after being prescribed a sugar pill, notice more improvement than if they'd been told there was nothing the doctor could do. "This is a placebo, I think you'll find it helps" may be a true and useful statement.
ReplyDeleteThat approach being, of course, roughly that of Monty Python's Bruces sketch - "you're allowed to teach Marx, as long as you make it clear that he was wrong".
ReplyDeleteDon't I recall one CT commentor, an economics lecturer, who stated they did precisely that?
btw:
ReplyDeleteDD, do you have any idea why the comment links for your articles are only visible from the main blogspot page, and not from the article permalinks
Unfortunately no I don't, and it pisses me off no end as well.
Full disclosure: without very compelling evidence, I tend to regard homoeopaths as prime practitioners of BACAI, pretentious and - worst of all - smug (unlike most 'Conspiracy Theorists' btw, however much Aaro etc try to project - except when they get together in their ghetto-forums and egg each other on, obviously). I don't think that's a sig. influence in scientific and other abstract Qs, but I'm probably a bit biased despite myself when it comes to policies that involve sending business their way or seeming to prove them right, even if their smugness is to some extent a defence mechanism.
ReplyDeleteStill, if hom'y is to be NHS funded, the potions had better be cheap generics, and there betn't be referrals to specialised homoeopaths, who certainly aren't qualified to do anything beyond the simple task of preparing and handing over the prescribed, er, preparation.
Also, 'is a placebo' doesn't get you to 'should be offered'. There are a lot of alternative placebos. AFAIK hom'y isn't an unusually effective one, so my pathological dislike of (supposed) smugness should be taken into account (or if you prefer, the general disutility of promoting a special class of placebo that is administered by a group claiming quasi-medical expertise and prone to usurping diagnostic, prognostic and prescriptive functions from the medics, with some ill-effects.)
Hom'y may be an especially effective placebo for certain people of course, e.g. those who think 'allopathy' (wtf?) is inferior, but should that be encouraged? (And is that a legitimate input to medical and approval-policy decisions?)
Also also, patient choice as such doesn't seem to provide a reason for hom'y to be offered. Patient choice gives you the right to refuse treatment or select from the Hippocratically prescribable options, but doesn't confer any authority to add things to the pharmacopoea.
A3, I do find the informed choice argument against placebo quite convincing. You could argue that professional status allows medics to stab people, so why can't they lie too, and I think that could in principle get you round a general prohibition on docs lying to their patients. But in fact it doesn't get to operate, since cutting is of course consistent with informed consent, lying about or withholding relevant facts can't be. And it's hard to see how the relevant facts could exclude all those that would reveal the placebo status of the treatment.
So I like Phil's (/BG's) suggestion for open placebo, effectively an explicit 'positive thinking' recommendation, using a ritual to help get it off the ground (cf. faith follows practice).
Besides, there is significant variation in the effectiveness of placebo, and on average it only works in a small proportion of the pop'n. A more transparent way of administering it could also mean it can be better monitored and tailored, and maybe even that patients could learn to become susceptible, wouldn't treat price as relevant, etc.
Different rituals are going to be preferable though. Once the placebo is fully out of the closet, taking a pill becomes no more salient than tying a knot in your hanky, and maybe even a touch ridiculous.
What is needed, in other words, is a rigorously developed Cognitive Neurological Therapy.
(OTOH, placebo appears to be more effective the more invasive the delivery mechanism, so there's no guarantee its effectiveness can be retained without some deception.)
I am toying with the possibility of banning homeopathic pills and only allowing the prescription of homeopathic remedies in the form of suppositories, but am coming up short of any rationale for this policy other than that it would be a laugh.
ReplyDelete(Snort) It could be quite popular too, with a certain demographic, in a Torygraph-exam-results-photo-story, Radio-Times-'shoulder'-massager kind of way. As the faintly lubricious 'toying' perhaps foreshadows.
ReplyDeleteOr you could go the full frisson, with an enema in the high Victorian Naturist style.
People want woo[2]. Actually, they want thoughtful, respectful and sympathetic treatment from general practitioners, but that's a) expensive and b) difficult to achieve given the social realities of the medical profession[4]. So woo is where we are now.
ReplyDeleteThere is something in this argument. The trouble is that it only applies to those people who believe in woo. The rest get stuffed.
You, B. Goldacre, and all sorts of others all identify the administering of placebo treatments as a major challeneges facing the medical profession. But what to do about it?
The status quo, which you seem to support, basically says 'yes if you're a gullible fool otherwise no' (brass tacks - if you believe in homeopathy you're a gullible fool). It might be arguably slightly better than a blanket 'no', but I don't see that it's a remotely satisfactory (or fair) answer to the challenge.
What's more - and this is what really pisses off the sceptics - it perversely incentivises gullible foolishness. And whilst it may not be the very end of the world, I think scientists have every right to be pissed off by that. The public understanding of science does matter, does have consequences beyond medicine, and should not be undermined by government.
Larry
Yes, if only people had made some suggestions about the way forward in this comment thread.
ReplyDeleteperversely incentivises gullible foolishness
by means of what cost-benefit calculation?
Yes if you're a gullible fool otherwise no
No: otherwise, give you some antidepressants or whatever you do believe in.
Whihc is a good point at which to quote a para from this: The FDA requires at least two placebo-controlled trials with positive results to authorize a drug indication, regardless of how many trials fail to demonstrate the drug's superiority to placebo. This appears to have led to situations in which many studies are conducted to obtain the requisite two positive results, which are then highlighted to suggest the drug's superiority to placebo. For example, the efficacy of Prozac could not be distinguished from placebo in 6 out of 10 clinical trials (Moore, 1999).
I knew they were bent, but not that it was quite so blatant and officially-sanctioned - because, correct me if I'm wrong, but if your method at the outset is to keep running trials until you get two +ive ones, the fact that you end up with two +ive ones is basically worthless. And if you are really doing that, by god is there a good reason to think you will be doing everything you can to fix the results.
This raises the (to me) interesting issue of the agent-centredness of scientific validity. Consider two otherwise indistinguishable sequences of four tests, two being positive. One sequence could be significant, if from the start the method had been to do exactly four tests. The other, argarising from the 'trial, trial, trial again' method, arguably(?) wouldn't be.
by means of what cost-benefit calculation?
ReplyDelete"If I believe in woo I can get sympathetic placebo medicine on the NHS. If I don't I can't."
Larry
"If I believe in woo I can get sympathetic placebo medicine on the NHS. If I don't I can't."
ReplyDeletesort of like a Happy Shopper version of Pascal's Wager.
I do think that there's a role for government in promoting the truth, and that this would IMO indicate a much stricter labelling regime for homeopathy. But at the end of the day, I'm still enough of an economist to believe that what people actually want matters a lot - it's not determinate, but it's important.
If we're going to have a big reform of placebo within the medical profession in the UK then I would guess that much more hostile treatment of homoepathy would be part of that. But I think you're underestimating the extent to which a) this would be a massive philosophical debate to have and b) it would involve an equally massive restructuring of how GPs acted and related to their patients, which nobody really knows how it could be achieved.
In the mean time, we're basically stuck with the unfortunate reality that if you're rational, it's difficult to simultaneously enjoy the comforts of religion.
This raises the (to me) interesting issue of the agent-centredness of scientific validity. Consider two otherwise indistinguishable sequences of four tests, two being positive. One sequence could be significant, if from the start the method had been to do exactly four tests. The other, argarising from the 'trial, trial, trial again' method, arguably(?) wouldn't be.
ReplyDeleteFrom the dregs of my memory of philosophy of mathematics, I don't think this is an example of agent relative standards of proof. The point is that the two samples are answering different questions - in fact the second one isn't answering a question at all. It's true that as an outsider you couldn't know that the second sample was dishonest, but this isn't per se a problem for the philosophy of statistics - it's just a tricky example of the difficulty of inferring errors in the data from the data themselves (or the disadvantages of a flat Bayesian prior).
If I believe in woo I can get sympathetic placebo medicine on the NHS. If I don't I can't.
ReplyDeleteWell the rewards are there, just not sure they can be seen as incentives.
Generating belief in that crudely pragmatist kind of way seems problematic on a Pascalian deliberative model (though unlike P's wager doesn't ignore an open-ended range of alternative possibilities).
That's exactly the kind of issue involved with the idea of 'open placebo' - but crucially, that doesn't actually involve 'forgetting' that the stuff is chemically inert.
I suppose on some subconscious/compartmentalised level. You go along, get the choice of either being sent packing with some pills or going to a clinic, and suppress scepticism, or something.
So yeah, OK, in that sense an incentive. Not sure how prevalent that kind of situation is going to be though.
And there certainly seems something wrong about having an elaborate and expensive conspiracy involving NHS-funded clinics and hospitals, (wtf do they do there?) just to get a bit of placebo.
I suppose that sceptics could be told:
ReplyDelete"I'll give you this suppository, which is a placebo, but first I'll give you this pill to temporarily suppress your scepticism"
"What's in the pill?"
"It's a pill which I'm giving you to temporarily suppress your scepticism".
dd - cheers, I'll have to mull that one over.
ReplyDeleteNnnngh - no can't resist further comment anyway. I suppose it's obvious (though I doubt it's widely appreciated) that an otherwise perfectly good study can be discredited by being cherry-picked from a series. I suppose you'd say that in such a case, it is only really part of a larger study.
And yes, I wasn't happy with 'agent-centred', and indeed certainly not about standards of proof.
I suppose one question would be how does the property of #asking question Q and not question R# manifest itself? Could it be a matter of potentially secret intentions?
Comment lag...
ReplyDeleteMaybe you could avoid the regress by using the suppository in the first instance - and make it a big 'un. It might not exactly suppress scepticism, but would probably distract from it.
3 in a row seems a bit like bad form, but just to acknowledge that the bit about secret intentions is indeed about dishonest sampling, rather than conceptual issues.
ReplyDeleteNo, criticising you takes very little effort. And no, occasional swearing doesn't make you a man of the people, particularly when you vomit out patronising effluent like the piece above.
ReplyDeleteI think I'll leave that one up because it looks a bit petty and small
ReplyDeleteHah!
ReplyDeleteThe present state of affairs offends them not because it causes misery, still less because it makes freedom impossible, but because it is untidy; what they desire, basically, is to reduce the world to something resembling a chess-board
ReplyDeleteFuck off George eh
No, I think he's spot on with that one; there really are a lot of people involved in left wing politics who don't basically like people. See any discussion of "chavs" vs "the decent working class".
ReplyDeleteWell I was specifically tellling George to fuck off regarding the chessboard (not chess-board) line, but since you mention it - no, I don't think so, certainly no more than anybody else, and your example is a spectacularly poor one since "chavs" is not a term much used on the left and indeed much-criticised there.
ReplyDeleteIt's also manifestly, obviously tosh to claim that leftists don't object to the present state of affairs because of the misery it engenders. That's a palpable nonsense, then and now.
Orwell very much not at his best when psychoanalysing leftists, a bad habit in almost any hands.
By thye way, are you sure you're not thinking of your "progressives" again? Or of Polly Toynbee in particular?
I was actually thinking of the Labour Party.
ReplyDeleteMmm. Do you actually mean the party, its members per se, or Patricia Hewitt and her aformentioned friend at the Guardian?
ReplyDeleteBy the way, this:
some other people who don't indulge in X themselves and are not affected materially by it, but who have a belief system and world view which makes them think that nobody should consume thing X.
No, it's not a "belief system", and it's not simply about whether people "should consume thing X". I don't want to be somebody who bangs on about relativism too much, but it is unhelpful to suggest science is a belief system no different from any other world view. Otherwise, apart from any other intellectual consequences, you can find youe comment boxes filling up with reactionary nutters.
I mean the median voter of the Parliamentary Labour party between 1997 and 2008. If I really have to identify a specific target, which I don't think I really do.
ReplyDeleteNo, it's not a "belief system", and it's not simply about whether people "should consume thing X". I don't want to be somebody who bangs on about relativism too much, but it is unhelpful to suggest science is a belief system no different from any other world view.
strawman, heal thyself. The word "science" does not appear in the paragraph you quoted, because it was not a paragraph about science. The habit of Richard Dawkins et al to make the (sociologically and philosophically ludicrous) claim that their own political views about the position of scientists in society are identical with science, is a big part of what I don't like about them.
perhaps by way of clarification of the above:
ReplyDeleteIt can be shown to an acceptable scientific standard of proof that homepathic medicines do people no medical good and potential medical harm.
But, this scientific fact does not entail any view, one way or the other, about whether homeopathic medicines should be banned, discouraged, promoted or prescribed. A proposition of that kind has to come from some other part of one's belief system and is not provable to the same scientific standard.
After all, it can be shown to a much better standard of evidence that alcohol and tobacco are bad for you, but this does not require scientists to be in favour of any particular view with respect to their regulation. Doctors are allowed to have whatever politics they like, intellectually as well as legally.
I'm intrigued that Justin sees such a difference between "chess-board" and "chessboard". I was hoping the OED would give some usage information, but it doesn't even acknowledge that there is a difference between the two forms.
ReplyDeleteIf I really have to identify a specific target, which I don't think I really do.
ReplyDeleteWell, it might be a more satisfactory approach than that of making large claims about a wide body of people which pejoratively attributes to them, on the basis of bugger all, motives essentially opposite to those which they perceive themselves as having, and at the same time denies motives which they manifestly do have.
I mean you can do that if you want, but are you really happy when, say, the forces of Decency do the same about antiwar people such as yourself? Or when conservatives do this with regard to liberals?
I don't think you would.
The word "science" does not appear in the paragraph you quoted
I know it didn't. But the point is that I do not think that people whose views you're discussing hold those views on the basis of something that can be reasonably be described as a belief system. I think they do so on the basis of something called science. You can quarrel with how strongly they express that view and how far they wish to take it, and I may (or may very well not) agree with you, but the attitude that people should not be ingesting, on the basis that it will do them good, substances for which there is no scientific basis for their beneficial value, is essentially a scientific one, not a belief system.
I'm intrigued that Justin sees such a difference between "chess-board" and "chessboard"
I should say it was Orwell's employment of the lazy metaphor rather than the hyphen with initially annoyed me, but I will say that I've been reading the literature of chess for nearly forty years without seeing the hyphen employed for any other reason than the word being split between two lines.
Well, it might be a more satisfactory approach than that of making large claims about a wide body of people which pejoratively attributes to them, on the basis of bugger all, motives essentially opposite to those which they perceive themselves as having, and at the same time denies motives which they manifestly do have.
ReplyDeleteI mean you can do that if you want, but are you really happy when, say, the forces of Decency do the same about antiwar people such as yourself? Or when conservatives do this with regard to liberals?
I don't think you would.
I think you're on a rather high horse here, not helped by the fact that I have actually told you who I was talking about, and we both know it would be absurdly easy for me to dig up reams of supporting evidence from the policies carried out and speeches made. On the other hand, I'm not sure you would be able to produce all that much about the motives of Polly Toynbee (which is a very curious example to have picked) or Patricia Hewitt, so mote and beam, mate.
I think they do so on the basis of something called science.
I know, you said so. But if you want anyone else to think that, you're going to have to tell me why you think that. I've already explained why I think that:
the attitude that people should not be ingesting, on the basis that it will do them good, substances for which there is no scientific basis for their beneficial value, is essentially a scientific one, not a belief system.
isn't right (facts don't imply value-claims; hepatologists don't have to be Prohibitionists). Science isn't about telling people what to do; it's about telling them what will happen if they do something.
This can be made rather clearer by consideration of the fact that economics is a science. To say that policy X will improve GDP growth and income inequality when chosen over policy Y is to make a scientific (falsifiable) statement. To say that policy X should, in fact, be chosen, is a different kind of statement, coming out of a belief and world-view about what is important.
"As it goes, there is a massive correlation between heavy and persistent tobacco use and psychological problems, and it's almost certainly mostly self-medication. Shame about the poor buggers' lungs, mind you."
ReplyDeleteStudies I've seen (not got links to hand) suggest there's no evidence that this 'self-medication' does any good.
It is worth noting that the placebo effect (in terms of the effect of giving people a sugar pill rather than regression to the mean and other aspects of placebo arms of clinical trials that aren;t relevant here) is not necessarily all that big for anything other than pain and psychological illness - something that even St. Ben Goldacre has a tendency to forget.
Of course we know the NHS is already prescribing placebo medications (I do it all the time, simple linctus for coughs, antihistamines for non-histamine mediated itching, there's a long list) but is this really a good thing or lainess? And the question is whether we should be paying lots of money to have someone make our sugar pill in the special magic way that homeopathy requires? The next question is whether we should be pissing money away giving people placebo medications rather than funding research and treatment that tries to target the roots of these sorts of placebo responsive conditions effectively (in terms of pain and more psychosomatic illness I'm thinking about CBT and similar psychological therapies here).
We've tried quite hard to stop people demanding antibiotics for their viral infections but it seems the argument here is to reverse that sort of education and just give them a sugar pill to shut them up. I think in these days of evidence based medicine you're sending rather mixed messages - certainly I'd like to see some decent evidence base for sugar pills rather than crappy lab experiments and hand waving before I go lying to my patients.
CBT and similar...
ReplyDeleteIn the case of 'quasi-placebo', it wouldn't be primarily behavioural. 'Neurological', as suggested above, or perhaps 'phenomenological'? There's at least the theoretical possibility of training in conscious control of identifiable CNS processes by means of feedback from EEG-type devices...
Come to think of it, CBT isn't necessarily particularly behavioural.The term's perhaps a sort of token tribute to Skinnerian (unrealistic) rigour. A bit like the faux-Popperian practice of falsifying a null hypothesis (only not as silly).
ReplyDeleteI think you're on a rather high horse here
ReplyDeleteI think that's the point I leave off, here: you're doing what you upbraid other people for doing, and I'm not comfortable with it. I spend too much time on the internet as it is, and I think in the circumstances this would be a good saving to make.
"Come to think of it, CBT isn't necessarily particularly behavioural.The term's perhaps a sort of token tribute to Skinnerian (unrealistic) rigour"
ReplyDeleteNot really - it reflects the behavioural (as opposed to the cognitive) aspects of the treatment - that is 'behavioural experiments' which have their origins in the purely behavioural therapy that preceded CBT.
"There's at least the theoretical possibility of training in conscious control of identifiable CNS processes by means of feedback from EEG-type devices..."
There is, but I wouldn't hold my breath.
pj, yeah I'll very happily dump the rank and irrelevant speculation about why the 'B' is in there, esp. the unintentional suggestion that CBT may be unrigorous.
ReplyDeleteBut 'behavioural experiments' aren't necessarily particularly behavioural either, so while the historical info is interesting, it doesn't (not that it was intended to) undermine my objection to my own argument that CBT is discontinuous with 'quasi-placebic cognitive therapy' (QPCT).
That idea was based on the idea that QPCT's locus of intervention is neural or experiential while CBT intervenes in behaviour. The objection, expanded, is that CBT also intervenes in things mental, including qualia like mood, and phenomena like depression which are treated to some extent as neurochemical imbalances - or at least as neurochemically treatable.
Maybe it doesn't really matter much, but I'd still say (gropingly) that QPCT is distinct from psychiatry, and perhaps has more in common with the treatment of disorders, like stress ulcers, that have a psychosomatic aetiology. Except that it intervenes in the psycho bit instead of the somatic bit, and the causal relationship is a static one rather than being driven by deviant events - pain, for example, depends on normal pain-sensitivity rather than abnormal psychic factors like stress. I dunno where I'm going with this, really...
On the EEG stuff, yes, no breath-holding, more of a 'direction of travel' thing. Though it occurs to me that it;s more plausible, at least from the standpoint of expense, that the development of reliable free-standing techniques for, say, pain-management might be developed with the assistance of biofeedback technology.
"the treatment of disorders, like stress ulcers, that have a psychosomatic aetiology"
ReplyDeleteWhat's a 'stress ulcer'? My understanding of a stress ulcer is an ulcer caused by physiological (not psychological stress) due to impaired circulation. Although in the past they believed that ulcers were caused by stress we now know that H.pylori infection is the primary aetiological factor.
I'm sure that for many conditions it is used for (e.g. IBS) the effect of CBT is not directly on changing cognitions in the way that Beck intended but rather part of a more non-specific reframing of the whole illness experience.
'Stress ulcers' - as is obvious I'm no expert. I think I was relying a bit too much on a casual conversation with a medic a few months ago, whose recollection was that the causal link with stress was well-attested (no doubt true in the 70s), but was offered on the implicit understanding that he's an authority in psychogeriatrics, not gastroenterology.
ReplyDeleteAside from standard proportioning of investigatory effort to expected importance, I can only cite filial piety in mitigation.
Anyway, it would certainly be nice to see the same kind of resources put into CBT-like approaches as are currently devoted to the elaborate charade of homoeopathic hospitals etc.
As a matter of presentation, stressing the 'mind-over-matter' aspect of treatments rather than any supposedly psychosomatic causes would probably be important in gaining patient acceptance. 'I can overcome this illness by force of will' is more inspiring and less ego-bruising than 'this is all my fault and I need to snap out of it'.
Any mild deception preserved in such a sales pitch might also retain some appeal to the supercilious tendencies of the bow-tie brigade (though most of those are happily sublimating various tendencies in theatre, very often with a satisfactory degree of skill and diligence, so far as outsiders can tell). /caricature
Personally that is exactly the approach I take - the emphasis is that the (largely psychosomatic) problem is to do with the nerves not firing properly, but there being nothing physical we can see on imaging or biopsy, and so any psychological intervention is about retraining those nerves from the top down.
ReplyDelete